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 Non-technical summary 
There is a substantial body of literature on the extent to which firms that receive venture 
capital financing generate more innovation than non-venture-backed companies. Most studies 
find that, on average, venture capital leads to increased innovation. However, this average 
impact is likely to be the result of the aggregation of very diverse cases. Venture capital 
investors are different from one another, and their deals may be based on different transaction 
structures. Both the characteristics of the investor and the structure of the deal are likely to 
moderate the relationship between venture capital financing and innovation. This paper is an 
attempt to shed light on this issue. 
First, we distinguish between two fundamentally different types of investors: governmental 
and private venture capitalists. These two types of investors have different objectives, skills, 
and investment horizons. Second, we differentiate between two transaction structures: 
syndicated and stand-alone deals. We further distinguish between syndicated deals led by 
private investors and those led by governmental investors, and between syndicated deals that 
are homogeneous (i.e., composed of investors of the same type) and those that are 
heterogeneous (i.e., composed of both private and governmental investors).  
By combining existing theories with empirical evidence on venture capital, we expect (i) 
firms backed by private investors to outperform firms backed by governmental investors, (ii) 
firms backed by a syndicate to outperform firms backed by a stand-alone investor and (iii) 
firms backed by a heterogeneous syndicate to outperform firms backed by a homogeneous 
syndicate. We hypothesize that private-led heterogeneous syndicates should be the form of 
venture capital that is most effective at promoting innovation in portfolio companies.  
We perform an empirical analysis on a sample of 865 young biotech and pharmaceutical 
companies from seven European countries and measure innovation output based on each 
firm’s patent stock. Our results, which are robust to alternative measures of patent stock, 
alternative econometric specifications and other alterations, confirm our hypotheses as 
follows: companies financed by syndicates and by private venture capital investors have a 
greater increase in innovation output than comparable non-venture-backed companies, and the 





 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Eine breite Literatur untersucht, ob Venture-Capital-finanzierte Unternehmen im Vergleich zu 
Unternehmen ohne Venture-Capital-Finanzierung innovativer sind. Ein Großteil der Studien 
kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass Venture Capital Innovationen fördert. Es gibt jedoch 
unterschiedliche Typen von Venture-Capital-Investoren, deren Finanzierungen divergierende 
Strukturen aufweisen. Sowohl Investorentypen als auch Finanzierungstrukturen bedingen die 
Beziehung zwischen Venture-Capital-Finanzierung und Innovation. Die vorliegende Studie 
soll diesen Umstand genauer untersuchen. 
Zunächst wird zwischen zwei unterschiedlichen Investorentypen unterschieden: zwischen 
öffentlichen und privaten Venture-Capital-Investoren. Sie haben verschiedene Ziele, 
verschiedene Fähigkeiten und Investitionshorizonte. Darüber hinaus wird zwischen zwei 
Finanzierungsstrukturen, der syndizierten und der alleinigen Finanzierung, unterschieden. Bei 
syndizierter Venture-Capital-Finanzierung wird nicht nur differenziert, ob das Syndikat von 
einem privaten oder öffentlichen Investor angeführt wird. Es wird außerdem zwischen 
homogenen (bestehend aus Investoren des gleichen Typs) und heterogenen (bestehend aus 
öffentlichen und privaten Investoren) Syndikaten unterschieden. 
Ausgehend von bestehenden Theorien wird erwartet, dass (i) von privaten Investoren 
finanzierte Unternehmen innovativer sind als von öffentlichen Investoren finanzierte 
Unternehmen, (ii) von einem Syndikat finanzierte Unternehmen innovativer sind als von 
alleinigen Investoren finanzierte Unternehmen und, dass (iii) von einem heterogenen Syndikat 
finanzierte Unternehmen innovativer sind als Unternehmen, die von einem homogenen 
Syndikat finanziert werden. Dies führt zu der Hypothese, dass heterogene Syndikate, die von 
einem privaten Venture-Capital-Investor angeführt werden, die effektivste Art von Venture 
Capital in Innovationsförderung ist. 
Um dies zu untersuchen, wird das Innovations-Output von 865 jungen Biotechnologie- und 
Pharmaunternehmen aus sieben europäischen Ländern untersucht. Ihr Innovations-Output 
wird anhand ihrer angemeldeten Patente gemessen. Die Ergebnisse bestätigen, dass 
Unternehmen, die von Syndikaten oder von privaten Investoren finanziert werden, einen 
höheren Innovations-Output aufweisen als vergleichbare Unternehmen ohne Venture-Capital-
Finanzierung. Die geeignetste Venture-Capital-Form für Innovation ist ein heterogenes 
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Abstract: Although there seems to be consensus in the literature that venture capital investors 
increase the innovation output of their portfolio companies, there is little evidence about how 
investor type (governmental vs. private) and transaction structure (syndicated vs. non-
syndicated) moderate this impact. Using a sample of 865 young biotech and pharmaceutical 
companies from seven European countries, we investigate which form of venture capital is 
most supportive of innovation. Our results suggest that in companies financed by syndicates 
and by private venture capital investors, the innovation output increases significantly faster 
than in non-venture-backed companies. The most supportive form is a heterogeneous 
syndicate (i.e., consisting of both types of venture capital investors) led by a private investor.  
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The development of innovation faces a significant funding gap which may hamper long-term 
economic growth and recovery (Hall and Lerner, 2010). This scenario may be particularly 
true in Europe, whose market is fragmented and insufficiently innovator friendly (European 
Commission, 2009). Moreover, in Europe, venture capital investors (VCs), which are one of 
the most appropriate candidates for financing young, innovative companies (Carpenter and 
Petersen, 2002), are disproportionately involved in late-stage and low-tech deals (Lawton, 
2002; Da Rin et al., 2006). Aware of these circumstances, European policymakers have 
repeatedly stressed the importance of developing a viable venture capital industry that would 
serve as the bedrock for future growth and economic stability (e.g., European Commission, 
2010).  
Another aspect of venture capital in Europe that is an interesting subject for academic 
research is the heterogeneity in the VCs’ governance structures, which often deviate from the 
classic Silicon-valley paradigm of independent venture capital funds (Bottazzi et al., 2004; 
Bottazzi et al., 2008). In many European countries, governmental venture capital funds have 
been established at the national or regional level; a few of the most active include The Biotech 
Fonds Vlaanderen in Belgium, SITRA in Finland, CDC Innovation in France, High-Tech 
Gründerfonds in Germany, Piemontech in Italy, and Scottish Enterprise in the UK. Bertoni et 
al. (2011) estimate that between 1994 and 2004, governmental venture capital investors were 
responsible for 19.3% of all high-tech investments in Europe; however, this figure is much 
higher in early stages and in sectors that have been specifically targeted by public policy. In 
our sample, at least one governmental VC is involved in as many as 43.1% of the investments. 
Whether governmental VCs are effective in fostering the innovative output of portfolio 
companies (which is one of the main reasons why they were set up in the first place) is a 
question that has received surprisingly little attention from academics. However, this is an 
important issue given the large importance of these investors in Europe and the hopes that 
European governments have for them. Do governmental VCs justify these hopes?  
In this work, we explore this question. Specifically, we investigate the extent to which private 
and governmental VCs differ in their impact on firms’ innovation output. In one respect, 
private VCs, as a result of their governance structure and profit-oriented behavior 
(Jääskeläinen et al., 2007), may possess better skills and incentives to spur innovation than 
governmental VCs. At the same time, private VCs may suffer from short-termism (Gompers, 
1996), which could hamper R&D spending and innovation (Lerner, 2002). A second aspect 
that deserves closer scrutiny is the effectiveness of syndicates between private and 
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governmental VCs. The literature shows that, in general, transaction structure (i.e., syndicated 
vs. non-syndicated investments) matters. Syndicates may lead to a better selection of 
investments and a higher value-added through the combination of complementary resources 
(e.g., Bygrave, 1987; Manigart et al., 2004). However, because several parties must 
coordinate within a syndicate, syndication gives rise to agency and transaction costs (e.g., 
Wright and Lockett, 2003), which may offset the positive effects. Both effects are potentially 
moderated by the type of VCs that are involved in the syndicate, although the empirical 
evidence supporting this potential is scarce. To investigate these issues, we rely upon a novel 
and extensive dataset of 865 young European biotech and pharmaceutical companies. We 
identify 159 first-round venture capital investments in sample companies between 1994 and 
2004.  
Our results confirm the view that, on average, VCs increase firms’ innovation output. We 
highlight significant differences in the impact of VCs on innovation with regard to both the 
VC type and the transaction structure. The innovation output of companies financed by 
private VCs increases significantly faster than that of companies financed by governmental 
VCs, and the innovation output of syndicates outpaces that of stand-alone investors as well. 
Heterogeneous syndicates led by private VCs (i.e., syndicates in which a private VC takes the 
lead but in which a governmental VC is also involved) seem to produce the economically and 
statistically most significant effect. These results are in line with the conjecture that 
syndication gives rise to both benefits and costs. The benefits that come from the combination 
of complementary resources within a syndicate are particularly pronounced in heterogeneous 
syndicates combining private and governmental VCs. Only in this case, and only under the 
leadership of a private VC, do these benefits seem to outweigh syndicate costs. These results 
are robust to the endogenous choice of VCs’ targets, which we control for with the use of 
different matching techniques, and to several alterations.  
This paper contributes to three strands of the existing literature. The first strand addresses the 
impact of VCs on innovativeness. In their seminal contribution, Kortum and Lerner (2000) 
find that venture capital is associated with a substantial increase in innovations in US 
manufacturing industries. The approach taken by Kortum and Lerner (2000) has often been 
replicated by later studies focusing on different samples and different levels of analysis. For 
example, Hirukawa and Ueda (2011) choose the same approach as Kortum and Lerner (2000) 
but include more recent data in their sample. Popov and Rosenboom (2009) carry out a 
country-level analysis across Europe. Bertoni et al. (2010) employ firm-level data of Italian 
new-technology-based firms. These studies confirm that venture capital spurs innovations. 
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However, VCs are also attracted by innovative companies (e.g., Haeussler et al., 2009; Cao 
and Hsu, 2011). Some studies find that this selection effect dominates and, once it is 
controlled for, VCs do not increase innovation (e.g., Engel and Keilbach, 2007). The present 
paper, which benefits from a large sample of European biotech and pharmaceutical 
companies, contributes to this literature and provides evidence on how venture capital is 
related to innovativeness.  
Second, the findings of this study contribute to the literature regarding the heterogeneity of 
VCs, particularly on the different impacts of governmental vs. private VCs on innovativeness. 
The empirical literature describes mixed results, and, therefore, additional research is needed 
in this area. For example, Brander et al. (2008) conclude that companies funded by 
governmental VCs generate fewer innovations, whereas Brander et al.’s (2010) results 
indicate the opposite. Our paper adds to this literature in that it shows whether, and under 
what circumstances, the governmental VCs are beneficial.  
Third, our research contributes to the literature on syndication. There is an extensive literature 
documenting the benefits and costs associated with syndication (see, e.g., Tykvová and 
Schertler, 2011, for a recent discussion). However, research analyzing the consequences of 
different syndicate structures on innovations is rare. To the best of our knowledge, there is 
only one study that addresses the impact of syndicate structure on innovative activity, namely, 
the study by Brander et al. (2010).  They show that companies financed by syndicates 
consisting of private and governmental VCs outperform control companies when a substantial 
fraction of funding comes from the private VC. In accordance with this result, we find that 
companies backed by heterogeneous syndicates outperform control companies only when a 
private VC takes the lead. Our paper makes two original contributions beyond the state of the 
art. Brander et al. (2010) only include VC-backed companies, whereas our sample also 
contains a matched control group of non-VC-backed companies. Thus, to Brander et al.’s 
(2010) findings on the differences between governmental and private VCs, we add new 
findings related to the forms of venture capital that are more beneficial to innovation when 
compared to non-VC-backed companies. It is important not only to know how governmental 
VCs (and different forms thereof) perform when compared to private VCs, but – to justify 
public policy actions – it is also crucial to know whether, and under what circumstances, 
governmental VC support is beneficial at all, i.e., in generating a higher innovative output 
than we observe with non-VC-backed companies. The second major contribution to this 
emerging research is that we not only focus on different forms of governmental support but 
also include different forms of private VC activities (private stand-alone vs. private 
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syndicates) in our analysis and find important differences that contribute to our understanding 
of the role different VC forms have on the innovative output of their portfolio companies. 
Specifically, our results suggest that private VCs are better at increasing innovative output 
only in heterogeneous syndicates and in stand-alone transactions but not in homogeneous 
private syndicates. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature and 
describe our research hypotheses. In Section 3, we present and describe our sample. In 
Section 4, we report the results of our analyses. In Section 5, we present concluding remarks. 
2 Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
VCs are financial intermediaries able to efficiently screen investment proposals in knowledge-
based firms (Chan, 1983; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Amit et al., 1998). The selected portfolio 
firms receive long-term equity funding and are closely monitored (Sahlman, 1990; Lerner, 
1995; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). Additionally, VCs provide value-added services 
(Hellmann and Puri, 2000; Sørensen, 2007; Luukkonen and Maunula, 2007a), such as 
coaching or mentoring. Investee firms also benefit from the network of contacts provided by 
reputable, well-connected VCs (Colombo et al., 2006; Hsu, 2006; Lindsey, 2008), which may, 
for instance, result in improved access to investment bankers. All of these activities could 
result in certification effects throughout the investment period up to the IPO phase 
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991). Consequently, VCs can have a positive impact on the 
innovation and performance of portfolio firms.  
Several studies link venture capital to innovation, in general, and to patenting activity, in 
particular. In their seminal contribution, Kortum and Lerner (2000) establish a stylized model 
of R&D expenditures, venture capital and innovation. By testing various specifications of a 
patent production function with US manufacturing industry-level data from 1965-1992, these 
authors find that venture capital is associated with a substantial increase in patenting. There is 
further evidence of the positive relation between venture capital financing and innovations at 
the country (Popov and Roosenboom, 2009), industry (Hirukawa and Ueda, 2011) and 
portfolio firm levels (Hellmann and Puri, 2000; Baum and Silverman, 2004; Bertoni et al., 
2010). Based on these findings, we formulate the first hypothesis: 
H1: VCs increase the innovation output of their portfolio companies.  
VCs are far from being homogeneous and, especially in Europe, there is a significant 
involvement of governmental investors (e.g., Bottazzi et al., 2004; Tykvová, 2006). The role 
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of governmental VCs in supporting knowledge-based companies is heavily discussed both in 
the academic literature and among practitioners, with a particular focus on the extent to which 
governmental VCs attract or crowd out private VCs (Leleux and Surlemont, 2003; Cumming 
and MacIntosh, 2006; Cumming, 2007; Brander et al., 2008; Cumming and Johan, 2009).1  
Private and governmental VCs differ in terms of their objectives, skills, and governance 
structures, and these differences affect the innovative output of their companies. First, 
whereas the primary objective of private VCs is to generate profits, which result from 
successful innovations, governmental VCs often focus on a broader set of goals, including 
building links between universities and the private sector, supporting the development of the 
venture capital industry, and increasing local employment levels (see, e.g., Cumming and 
MacIntosh, 2004; Cumming and Johan, 2009). Second, private VCs may have better skills 
than governmental VCs in selecting promising portfolio companies and in coaching and 
monitoring these companies (Leleux and Surlemont, 2003; Luukkonen and Maunula, 2007b; 
Luukkonen et al., 2011), which, again, may lead to a greater innovative output of these 
companies. Third, in general, private VCs have more performance-sensitive contracts than 
governmental VCs (Jääskeläinen et al., 2007). Therefore, private VCs posses increased 
incentives to provide their portfolio firms with the financial and non-financial resources they 
need to pursue the development of innovations. For all these reasons, we would expect a 
higher increase of innovative activities associated with the involvement of private VCs 
compared to the involvement of governmental VC. We summarize this discussion in our 
second hypothesis: 
H2: Private VCs increase the innovation output of their portfolio companies more than 
governmental VCs. 
VCs may either invest alone or form a syndicate. Syndication is beneficial because it 
combines the financial and non-financial resources of syndicate members (e.g., Bygrave, 
1987; Manigart et al., 2004). A syndicate partner delivers an alternative opinion on company 
future prospects during the screening and selection phase (see Casamatta and Haritcahbalet, 
2007; Lerner, 1994). During the investment phase, the combination of complementary non-
financial resources may provide companies with better coaching and monitoring (e.g., 
Cumming and Walz, 2010; Brander et al., 2002; Tian, 2012). In addition, syndicates are able 
                                                 
1 See, more generally, Lerner (2009) for a comprehensive survey of how governments have supported 
entrepreneurs and VCs across decades and continents. 
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to provide more financial resources for costly R&D than stand-alone investors. For all these 
reasons, we would expect a higher innovative output in companies backed by syndicates 
compared to those backed stand-alone investors: 
H3: Syndicates increase the innovation output of their portfolio companies more than stand-
alone VCs. 
The complementarities in resources, which we expect to be beneficial in increasing patenting 
activity, will be particularly pronounced when syndicates are heterogeneous. As argued 
above, private VCs may be better at fostering innovative activity due to their objectives, 
skills, and governance structures. However, private VCs, at least those that invest via closed-
end funds, may follow short-term goals (e.g., Gompers, 1996) and have tight budget 
constraints that may deter innovative projects (Lerner, 2002). Governmental VCs are typically 
not under pressure to generate fast returns as private VCs do and may therefore more easily 
implement long-term projects. This is likely to be particularly relevant in sectors such as 
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, where R&D requires a long time to market and 
substantial resources (Di Masi et al., 1991; Di Masi and Grabowski, 2007). Syndication 
between more efficient and better-skilled private VCs and long-term-oriented governmental 
VCs (i.e., heterogeneous syndicates) may therefore be more successful in increasing 
innovative output than homogeneous (private or governmental) syndicates. Moreover, 
governmental financing is most successful when it attracts additional money from private 
investors (Takalo and Tanayama, 2010), consistently with what Lerner (1999) finds about the 
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program in the US. We therefore expect the 
following: 
H4: Syndicates consisting of private and governmental VCs (heterogeneous syndicates) 
increase the innovation output of their portfolio companies more than homogeneous 
syndicates.  
Finally, we expect that heterogeneous syndicates may differ markedly in their effects 
depending upon which part leads. The lead investor is the most actively involved in the 
management of the company (Wright and Lockett, 2003). Because we expect private VCs to 
be more successful than governmental VCs at increasing innovative output, we also expect 
syndicates led by private VCs to dominate those led by governmental VCs: 
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H5: When a private VC leads a heterogeneous syndicate, the innovation output of the 
portfolio companies increases more than when a governmental VC leads the heterogeneous 
syndicate.  
In the preceding paragraphs, we have gradually introduced the dimensions that describe 
venture capital transactions: the type of investors, the presence of a syndicate, and the 
syndicate characteristics. By combining these dimensions, we obtain six different transaction 
forms: private stand-alone, governmental stand-alone, homogenous private syndicate, 
homogeneous governmental syndicate, government-led heterogeneous syndicate, and private-
led heterogeneous syndicate. The above discussion suggests that the latter transaction form 
should dominate the others in terms of its impact on innovation output because it combines all 
the beneficial features discussed above: the presence of a private VC (H2), syndication (H3), 
and a heterogeneous syndicate (H4) led by a private VC (H5). We therefore expect the 
following: 
 H6: Private-led heterogeneous syndicates increase the innovation output of their portfolio 
companies more than other forms of venture capital.  
3 Data and descriptive statistics 
Our sample includes 865 European VC-backed (159) and non-VC-backed (706) companies 
from the biotechnology (673) and pharmaceutical (192) industries from seven countries (see 
Table 1). All VC-backed and non-VC-backed companies included in this sample were 
founded after 1984 and were independent at foundation. All VC-backed companies received 
their first round of venture capital financing between 1994 and 2004 and were less than 10 
years old at that time. The sample is extracted from the VICO database, a large-scale dataset 
on European high-tech entrepreneurial companies that was created with the support of the EC 
Seventh Framework Programme. The sampling process and the overall structure of the VICO 
database are described by Bertoni and Martí (2011).  
We use patent stock to measure innovation output. We obtain information on patenting 
activity from the PATSTAT database. PATSTAT provides detailed information on patent 
applications and grants (over 70 million records) in more than 80 countries worldwide, 
including patent assignee names, citations, publications, application and grant years, industry 
patent classes, priority countries, and other information. This database allows us to analyze 
the evolution of the patenting activity of sample firms as reflected in their patent stock. We 
are also able to compute quality-weighted measures of patent stock that may more effectively 
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capture the value of innovative output (see, e.g., Griliches, 1998; van Pottelsberghe and van 
Zeebroeck, 2011). The main dependent variable of our analysis is the increase in (log) patent 
stock between the investment year t and year t+τ. As is customary, we compute the patent 
stock of sample companies based on the number of granted patents (since the application 
year) and depreciated at 15% (see, e.g., Griliches, 1998).2 Our main dependent variable, 
therefore, equals [log(1+patent stockt+τ)-log(1+0.85τ patent stockt)] with τ=1,…,5.3 This 
variable, which has a lower bound of zero, captures the extent to which the patent stock of a 
company in year t+τ exceeds the patent stock in year t (discounted τ years). 
Biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries provide an attractive setting for investigating 
how different forms of venture capital financing affect innovation output reflected in patent 
stock changes. In these industries, patents are considered most important as a device for 
protecting innovation (see, e.g., Hall, 2009), which makes patents a reasonably reliable 
measure of innovation. The more patenting is considered to be an important means of 
intellectual property rights protection, the less an increase in patenting after a venture capital 
investment is due to reverse causality. This reverse causality would be an issue when 
companies change their protection mechanism after receiving venture capital. For example, 
firms that based their intellectual property rights protection mostly on secrecy before 
receiving venture capital would most likely shift toward a different protection mechanism, 
such as patenting, because secrecy may be jeopardized for firms that receive venture capital 
financing (Ueda, 2004). Accordingly, we would expect to observe an increase in patenting 
activity after venture capital investments even without any real increase in innovative activity. 
In other words, if measures of intellectual property rights protection other than patents are 
most important, patenting, as a proxy for innovation, would be affected by a measurement 
error that is correlated with venture capital investments. Another benefit of focusing on these 
industries is that this focus helps to reduce the heterogeneity that may arise not only in 
response to the different use and valuation of patents across technological regimes (e.g., 
                                                 
2 A variety of depreciation rates are used in the literature: Griliches (1998), Hall et al. (2000) and Bertoni et al. 
(2010) use 15%; Henderson and Cockburn (1996) and Ahuja and Katila (2001) use 20%; Blundell et al. (1995) 
and Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005) use 30%. Each of these authors verify the robustness of their results using 
different depreciation rates, and, to the best of our knowledge, in no case do they find any substantial difference 
in the results. We also estimate our models using alternative discounting rates and a non-discounted measure of 
patent stock as robustness checks and obtain qualitatively identical results. 
3 The use of a log transformation to address the skewness of patent stock is customary in the literature (e.g., 
Chemmanur et al., 2011). In our sample, the skewness of untransformed patent stock is 5.94, which drops to 2.89 
after the log transformation. 
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Cohen et al., 2000) but also as a result of the different likelihoods of venture capital financing 
across industries, which would be difficult to control for in a multi-industry setting.  
Table 1 provides an overview of our dataset (all companies, VC-backed companies, non-VC-
backed companies) composition by country, sector, and foundation period. Table 1 also 
reports some descriptive statistics. The UK, Germany and France represent a large portion of 
the population (accounting for 70% of the total). The ranking is broadly consistent with the 
relative size of biotechnology industries in Europe (OECD, 2006). With regard to the number 
of VC-backed companies in our sample, Germany is the most represented country, followed 
by the UK. Again, this finding is comparable to OECD (2006) statistics pertaining to venture 
capital activity in biotech. Germany and the UK have the second and third highest number of 
VC-backed biotech companies, respectively, after the US (German venture capital 
investments in biotech account for 23% of all non-US investments; UK venture capital 
investments in biotech account for 15%).  
Overall, the distribution of companies in our sample by foundation period exhibits an 
increasing trend over time, with 204 companies (23.6%) founded between 1984 and 1995, 
292 (33.8%) between 1995 and 1999 and 369 (42.7%) between 2000 and 2004. The time 
trend is much more pronounced for VC-backed companies: only 9 VC-backed companies 
(5.7%) were founded before 1995, 65 (40.9%) between 1995 and 1999 and 85 (53.5%) 
between 2000 and 2004. This trend can be explained by the relatively young history of 
venture capitalism in Europe. The number and amounts invested increased substantially in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s (see EVCA Yearbook, different issues). As a result, companies 
founded during this period had a much higher chance, other things being equal, of obtaining 
venture capital than companies founded in the 1980s and early 1990s. Consequently, VC-
backed firms were significantly younger than non-VC-backed firms. The average age of the 
two groups in 2008 was 8.86 and 10.94 years, respectively, with the difference significant at 
the 1% level. On average, companies in our sample had 3.8 million Euro net annual sales and 
23.5 employees when the company is at median age (5 years), with no significant difference 
between VC-backed and non-VC-backed companies. 
Our descriptive statistics highlights whether VC-backed and non-VC-backed companies 
differ, on average, in terms of their patent stock. For this, we compute the average level of 
patent stock of VC-backed and non-VC-backed companies at median age. We find a very 
large and statistically highly significant difference in the average patent stock, which was 1.13 
for VC-backed companies and 0.28 for non-VC-backed companies.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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To understand whether the difference in the patent stock is driven by selection (i.e., by VCs 
selecting more innovative companies) or treatment (i.e., by VCs unlocking firms’ innovation 
potential), we extract a matched control sample from the group of non-VC-backed companies. 
The rationale for this extraction is that we want to compare the post-investment evolution of a 
VC-backed company with a company that, at the time of financing, exhibits similar 
characteristics. In particular, VC-backed firms may already have an above-average patent 
stock at the time of first investment because VCs normally select firms with larger patent 
stocks (e.g., Haeussler et al., 2009).  
To build the matched control sample, we rely on propensity-score matching. For every VC-
backed (i.e., treated) company, we select (without replacement) the non-VC-backed (i.e., non-
treated) company that, in the same year in which the investment occurs, has the most similar 
propensity score (i.e., the estimated likelihood of receiving venture capital). The panel 
structure of our dataset makes it possible to estimate propensity scores using a survival model. 
We compute the probability that a company receives its first round of VC financing in any 
given year conditional upon not having received it before. In computing the propensity score, 
we control for company stage, number of employees, and patent stock and include a full set of 
country and year dummies. We are able to compute the propensity score (at the time of 
financing) for 153 VC-backed companies.  
In the robustness section, we perform an alternative matching process because the selection 
criteria for VCs can differ depending upon their typology. Accordingly, we employ two 
separate survival models, one for private and one for governmental VCs, to estimate the 
probability that a company will receive its first round of private or governmental venture 
capital financing in any given year. In computing the two propensity scores, we control for 
company age, sales and entry patent stock and include a full set of country and year dummies. 
We then build the estimation sample by matching any private VC-backed company with a 
non-VC-backed company with the closest probability (propensity score) of receiving 
investment from a private VC. We then repeat the same procedure for governmental VC-
backed firms. A detailed description of the matching procedures is reported in the Appendix. 
The result of the primary matching process is reported in Table 2. As expected, the matched 
control sample exhibits a distribution that is much closer to the VC-backed sample than that 
of the non-VC-backed sample presented in Table 1. The distribution across countries and 
industries is not significantly different between the VC-backed and the matched control 
samples ( ( ) 88.162 =χ  and ( ) 51.012 =χ , respectively). However, VC-backed companies 
were, on average, still significantly younger than their counterparts in the matched control 
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sample (t-statistic = -3.18). Despite its statistical significance, this difference is limited in 
magnitude: VC-backed companies had an average age (at 2008) of 8.86 years compared to an 
average of 10.32 years in the matched control sample. At the time of the matching, the sales 
and employment of VC-backed and matched control companies did not statistically differ. 
More interestingly, as a result of the matching procedure, VC-backed and matched control 
companies had a similar patent stock at the time of the match, equal to 0.78 and 0.53, 
respectively.4  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
As a first, illustrative, example of the progress of innovation output after venture capital 
investments, we report in Figure 1 the average increase in log patent stock of VC-backed and 
matched control companies over a five-year period after the first investment. Consistently 
with Hypothesis 1, the patent stock of VC-backed companies grows at a faster rate than that 
of the matched control sample in each of the five years after the investment event, and this 
difference is highly statistically significant. Five years after the investment event, the increase 
in log patent stock is 2.7 times greater for VC-backed companies than for the matched control 
sample (0.236 vs. 0.086). 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
In Table 3, we report the breakdown of the VC-backed sample according venture capital 
form. Of the 153 investments, 109 (71.2%) are stand-alone, and 44 (28.8%) are syndicated. 
These numbers confirm the low syndication rates in Europe found in previous studies (e.g., 
Manigart et al. (2004) report a syndication rate of 28.7% in Europe). Out of the 109 stand-
alone deals, 70 (64.2%) are conducted by a private VC and 39 (35.8%) by a governmental 
VC. Out of the 44 syndicated deals, 30 (68.2%) are led by a private VC and 14 (31.8%) by a 
governmental VC. Overall, governmental VCs are involved in 66 of the 153 deals (43.1%), 
confirming the importance of governmental VCs in the European biotech and pharmaceutical 
sectors. Of the 25 heterogeneous syndicates, 13 are led by private VCs and 12 by 
governmental VCs. Homogeneous governmental syndicates, in contrast, are represented by 
only two observations in our sample: governmental VCs seem either to invest in stand-alone 
                                                 
4 The values of sales, employment and patent stock are much lower than in Table 1 because in Table 1, the 
values are measured at the company age of five years, and in Table 2, they are measured at the time of matching 
(with an average of one year). 
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deals or together with private VCs but very rarely form syndicates with other governmental 
VCs.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Figure 2 provides some preliminary insights on the evolution of the log patent stock across 
different forms of venture capital. For reference, we also depict, in each panel, the 
development of the log patent stock for the matched control sample. The vertical axis shows 
the increase in log patent stock in t+τ over the discounted level of log patent stock in t. Panel 
A of Figure 2 compares the evolution of firms backed by private VCs with those backed by 
governmental VCs (in case of a heterogeneous syndicate, the firm is assigned to the category 
of the syndicate leader). The increase in patent stock is only slightly higher for firms backed 
by governmental VCs than it is for the matched control sample. The increase is much higher 
for companies backed by private VCs, in line with Hypothesis 2. Panel B of Figure 2 
compares the increase in patent stock of syndicated and stand-alone deals. We observe that 
both transaction types lead to a steady increase in firms’ patent stocks over the matched 
control sample but that the pace seems to be more sizeable for syndicated than for stand-alone 
investments (in line with Hypothesis 3). Panel C compares different forms of syndicated 
deals. The patent stock development in firms backed by homogeneous syndicates is similar to 
that of firms backed by stand-alone VCs. The increase in patent stock in heterogeneous 
syndicates, in contrast, seems to be much greater, consistent with Hypothesis 4. Finally, in 
Panel D, we compare private- and government-led heterogeneous syndicates. Private-led 
heterogeneous syndicates seem to outperform not only government-led heterogeneous 
syndicates, consistent with Hypothesis 5, but also all other forms of venture capital, consistent 
with Hypothesis 6.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
4 Empirical analyses 
4.1 The role of VCs, VC type and syndication 
4.1.1 Specifications 
Table 4 presents our regression results for the increase in patent stock one to five years after 
the investment in the sample of VC-backed and matched control companies. We regress the 
increase in log patent stock on the VC dummy (Model 1) as well as on different variables 
related to venture capital forms (Models 2-5). With these regressions, we test Hypotheses 1 to 
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5. We control for patent stock at the time of the investment. Blundell et al. (1995) show that, 
due to path dependence in innovation activity, the “entry patent stock” adequately controls for 
fixed effects. Essentially, including the entry patent stock allows us to partially control for the 
unobservable “innovativeness” of companies (see also Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Dushnitsky 
and Lenox, 2005; Bertoni et al., 2010).  
We also add company age to account for the influence of maturity on patenting. We estimate 
alternative specifications in which company size is used instead of company age (both 
variables cannot be included simultaneously due to their high correlation) as a robustness 
check. We include country dummies to capture country-specific time-invariant characteristics 
that may affect patenting. As a robustness check, we exclude countries one by one to 
determine whether a single country dominates the results. In another robustness check, we 
estimate the models excluding pharmaceuticals. Finally, we employ year dummies to account 
for effects that are caused by changing environments over time.  
We employ OLS regressions (with standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity) in this 
main analysis. In the robustness section, we use Tobit models to take into account the fact that 
the majority of companies do not patent, and, as a result, their patent stock and, consequently, 
their patent stock increase is equal zero. Although the Tobit model is appropriate for censored 
data such as ours, it is susceptible to misspecification (see, e.g., Nelson, 1981), which 
prevents us from using it for the main analysis. 
4.1.2 Results 
Panel A of Table 4 depicts the results for the patent stock in t+3. Panel B of Table 4 presents 
the results for years t+1, t+2, t+4, and t+5 (only coefficients on the VC-related variables are 
reported for the sake of readability).  
Model 1 suggests that venture capital financing is positively related to the post-VC patent 
stock increase two to five years after the venture capital investment. For example, three years 
after the investment, the increase in patent stock is higher in VC-backed than in matched 
control companies by a factor of 0.064. The difference is significant at the 10% level and 
lends support to our Hypothesis 1. The size of the effect is better understood by looking at its 
absolute level. The expected patent stock for an average non-VC-backed company in year t+3 
is 0.276.5 If the same company received funding from a VC in year t, we would expect instead 
a patent stock of 0.360. Interestingly, Panel B of Table 4 shows that, as suggested by Figure 1, 
                                                 
5 The expected patent stock of an “average company” is computed by incorporating population averages of 
company age and initial patent stock. Country and year fixed effects are also population averaged. 
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the difference between VC-backed companies and the matched control sample widens over 
time and becomes more statistically significant. 
In Models 2-5, we look into the group of VC-backed companies in more detail and compare 
different VC forms by testing for differences in their coefficients. In addition, by determining 
whether a coefficient is significant, we compare the different forms of VC to the matched 
control group. This latter comparison provides important information on how the different VC 
forms contribute to increased innovation output when compared to that of the matched control 
firms. In Model 2, we compare two groups of companies: those whose lead investor is a 
private VC and those whose lead investor is a governmental VC. The first group includes 
stand-alone deals made by private VCs, homogenous syndicates of private VCs and 
heterogeneous syndicates led by private VCs; the latter group consists of stand-alone deals of 
governmental VCs, homogeneous syndicates of governmental VCs and government-led 
heterogeneous syndicates. Model 2 reveals that companies in which a private VC takes the 
lead exhibit a significantly higher increase in patent stock than the matched control group in 
years t+2 to t+5. In absolute terms, an average company backed in year t by a private VC 
would have, in year t+3, an expected patent stock of 0.405. In contrast, companies with a lead 
governmental VC do not increase their patent stock more than the matched control group in 
any of the five years after the investment. The difference between the coefficients for the 
private and governmental lead dummies is significant at the 10% level in years t+2 to t+5. 
These results are in line with our Hypothesis 2.  
Model 3 compares syndicated to stand-alone transactions. Syndicated transactions include 
homogeneous private syndicates, homogeneous governmental syndicates, private-led 
heterogeneous syndicates, and government-led heterogeneous syndicates. Stand-alone 
transactions consist of governmental and private stand-alone deals. In years t+1 to t+5, the 
coefficient of the syndicate dummy is highly statistically significant, indicating that 
syndicates realize a greater increase in patent stock than the matched control group. In 
absolute terms, an average company backed in year t by a syndicate of VCs would have, in 
year t+3, an expected patent stock of 0.490. The coefficient of the stand-alone dummy is 
always insignificant. The difference between the coefficients of the syndicated and stand-
alone dummies is statistically significant in years t+3 to t+5. These results lend support to our 
Hypothesis 3.  
Model 4 examines the impact of the syndicate structure. The question is how VC 
heterogeneity within a syndicate affects the evolution of the patent stock. To address this 
question, syndicated transactions are divided into two further subgroups: heterogeneous and 
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homogeneous syndicates. In all five years, the coefficient of the heterogeneous syndicate 
dummy is highly statistically and economically significant, whereas the coefficient of the 
homogenous syndicate dummy is always insignificant. In absolute terms, an average company 
backed in year t by a heterogeneous syndicate would have, in year t+3, an expected patent 
stock of 0.617. These results suggest that only companies financed by heterogeneous, but not 
by homogeneous, syndicates increase their patent stock more than matched control 
companies. The difference between the coefficients of the heterogeneous and homogeneous 
syndicate dummies is statistically significant at the 5% level in years t+1 to t+5. These results 
are in line with Hypothesis 4. 
Finally, Model 5 examines the effects of heterogeneous syndicates in more detail and 
investigates whether the leader of the syndicate has an effect. To analyze this issue, we 
interact the lead private dummy with the heterogeneous syndicate dummy. The coefficient of 
this interaction term is statistically significant and positive, whereas the effect of the 
heterogeneous syndicate dummy and the effect of the lead private dummy remain statistically 
insignificant. In absolute terms, an average company backed in year t by a heterogeneous 
syndicate led by a private VC would have, in year t+3, an expected patent stock of 0.896. 
These results suggest that a significant increase in patent stock is observed when VCs 
combine complementary resources (in a heterogeneous syndicate) with an efficient syndicate 
structure (under a private-led VC). The difference between the coefficients of the 
heterogeneous syndicate dummy and the interaction term is statistically significant at the 5% 
level in years t+1, t+2, t+4 and t+5, giving support to our Hypothesis 5.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
4.2 Transaction forms  
4.2.1 Specifications 
In this section, we compare transaction structures directly by studying the innovation output 
associated with each of them. Table 5 examines this issue by regressing the increase in log 
patent stock, 1 to 5 years after the venture capital investment, on a dummy for five transaction 
forms: private stand-alone, governmental stand-alone, homogeneous private syndicate, 
private-led heterogeneous syndicate and governmental syndicate. This latter form is a 
combination of two forms that do not have a sufficient number of observations to justify 
keeping them separate: the homogeneous governmental syndicate and government-led 
heterogeneous syndicate. (The results are, however, robust toward their separate inclusion.) 
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The reference category is again the matched control group. With these regressions, we test 
Hypothesis 6. The control variables and regression approach remain the same as in Table 4. 
We perform the same robustness checks as for the regressions in Table 4.  
4.2.2 Results 
The results presented in Table 5 indicate that in each of the years 1 to 5 after the transaction, 
firms backed by private-led heterogeneous syndicates increase the patent stock substantially 
more than the matched control companies. The gap increases over time, is economically 
sizeable and is statistically significant. More interestingly, private-led heterogeneous 
syndicates dominate all other forms in all other years in terms of their effect on the innovation 
output. From year t+2 onward, the difference between the coefficient of the private-led 
heterogeneous syndicate dummy and any of the other forms’ dummies is always economically 
and statistically highly significant at the 1% level (in year t+1, the dummy is also significant, 
albeit at a lower level). Thus, even if other venture capital forms (such as private stand-alone) 
may be beneficial to innovative output (as compared to matched control companies), private-
led heterogeneous syndicates are the most beneficial form of venture capital for promoting 
innovation in biotech and pharmaceuticals. These results strongly support our Hypothesis 6.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
4.3 Robustness  
We perform various checks, which we mentioned in previous sections, to verify that our 
results from Tables 4 and 5 are robust. In particular, we employ (i) alternative econometric 
approaches, (ii) alternative patenting variables, (iii) alternative control variables, (iv) 
alternative sample specifications, and (v) an alternative matching technique. We also re-
estimate all models on a balanced sample including 258 companies (for which we have 
observations in all years t+1 to t+5). Our main outcomes remain robust toward these checks. 
We present selected results (for the model from Table 5 and year t+3) in Table 6. In all these 
alternative models, companies backed by private-led heterogeneous syndicates have a 
significantly greater increase in patent stock after the venture capital investment compared to 
matched control firms. In addition, in all specifications, private-led heterogeneous syndicates 
have a much larger effect on the increase in patent stock than any other venture capital form. 
This difference is (with one exception) always highly statistically significant, in most cases at 
the 1% significance level. We present results from the following specifications: (i) in Column 
1, we employ Tobit models instead of the multivariate regression models; (ii) in Columns 2 
17 
and 3, we use as dependent variables patent stock weighted by family size (i.e., the 
geographical scope of the patent) and non-discounted patent stock, respectively; (iii) in 
Column 4, we estimate an alternative specification in which company size is used instead of 
company age; (iv) in Columns 5 and 6, we report the results of estimates excluding the UK 
(i.e., the country with the largest venture capital activity) and pharmaceutical companies, 
respectively; and (v) in Column 7, we present results based on an alternative matching process 
based on a separate matching equation for private and governmental VCs.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
5 Conclusion 
Our paper contributes to a better understanding of the effects of venture capital on portfolio 
companies. Using a novel sample of young European companies from the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical sectors, we investigate how venture capital financing, in its different forms, 
affects the innovation output of portfolio companies as measured by the increase in their 
patent stock. Our results indicate that venture capital investments encourage patenting, as the 
existing literature has suggested, but that this effect is only present for certain forms of 
venture capital. Specifically, private venture capital investors and syndicates seem to be the 
forms that increase innovative output. Our findings lend support to the conclusion that 
syndicates between private and governmental venture capital investors, in which the private 
investor takes the lead, are the most efficient form in terms of innovation production that 
outperforms all other forms. These results contribute to recent discussions in the literature (i) 
on the impact of venture capital on patenting, (ii) on the consequences of venture capital 
heterogeneity and (iii) on syndication.  
Because our results help to better understand the role of governmental venture capital 
investors in the process of generating innovations, they provide not only a contribution to the 
academic literature but also have important implications for public policies that aim at 
fostering innovation. Whereas most of the literature has focused on the extent to which 
governmental venture capital attracts or crowds out private investors, in this work, we show 
that the mode of investment used by governmental venture capital investors is also a key 
variable in the design of effective innovation policies. Specifically, to support innovation, 
governmental venture capital investors should not invest alone but should syndicate with 
private partners. In addition, private venture capital investors should be allowed by their 
governmental partners to lead the syndicate. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Distribution and descriptive statistics on the population of companies  
 VC-backed 
Non-VC-
backed All  
     
No. of companies 159 706 865  
Distribution 
Belgium 18 48 66  
Finland 14 45 59  
France 14 111 125  
Germany 55 148 203  
Italy 7 38 45  
Spain 15 77 92  
United Kingdom 36 239 275  
     
Biotechnology 133 540 673  
Pharmaceuticals 26 166 192  
     
Founded 1984-1995 9 195 204  
Founded 1995-1999 65 227 292  
Founded 2000-2004 85 284 369  
Mean 
Age in 2008  8.86 10.94 10.56 [-4.79]*** 
     
Sales at median age  3,782 3,845 3,835 [-0.03] 
     
Employees at median age 25.76 22.96 23.49 [0.36] 
     
Patent stock at median age  1.13 0.28 0.43 [4.85]*** 
     
 
Legend: Sales are expressed in thousands of Euros (deflated using CPI and expressed at the real 2008 level). Patent stock is 
the number of granted patents since the application year depreciated at 15%. ***, ** and * indicate differences in means 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The value of the t-test (on VC-backed and non-VC-backed group 
equality) is shown in square brackets. The median age is 5 years. 
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Table 2: Distribution and descriptive statistics on VC-backed companies and the 
matched control sample 
 VC-backed Matched  All  
     
No. of companies 153 153 306  
Distribution 
Belgium 18 17 35  
Finland 14 12 26  
France 13 14 27  
Germany 54 45 99  
Italy 7 14 21  
Spain 15 14 29  
United Kingdom 32 37 69  
     
Biotechnology 127 120 247  
Pharmaceuticals 26 33 59  
     
Founded 1984-1995 9 30 39  
Founded 1995-1999 62 49 111  
Founded 2000-2004 82 74 156  
Mean 
Age in 2008  8.86 10.32 9.59 [-3.18]*** 
     
Sales at time of matching 2,183 1,514 1,860 [0.46] 
     
Employees at time of matching 10.80 13.35 12.02 [-0.37] 
     
Patent stock at time of matching  0.78 0.53 0.66 [0.84] 
     
 
Legend: Sales are expressed in thousands of Euros (deflated using CPI and expressed at the real 2008 level). Patent stock is 
the number of granted patents since the application year depreciated at 15%. ***, ** and * indicate differences in means 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The value of the t-test (on VC-backed and matched control group 
equality) is shown in square brackets.  
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Table 3: The distribution of VC-backed companies by venture capital forms 
 Private-led Government-led 
Total 
 
    
Syndicate 30 14 44 
…heterogeneous 13 12 25 
…homogeneous 17 2 19 
    
Stand-alone  70 39 109 
    
Total 100 53 153 
 
Legend: In stand-alone deals, only one VC (either private or governmental) invests in the company in the first round. In 
syndicated deals, more than one VC is involved in the first round of financing. Syndicates are homogeneous if the group of 
investors belongs to a single category (either private or governmental). In heterogeneous syndicates, private and 
governmental investors co-invest. 
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Table 4: Venture capital, VC type, syndication and patent stock  
Panel A: 3 years after VC involvement 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
VC dummy 0.064*     
 (0.032)     
Private-led  0.097**[+]   0.061 
  (0.041)   (0.051) 
Government-led  0.005    
  (0.037)    
Syndicate   0.155***[++]   
   (0.054)   
Stand-alone   0.027 0.028 -0.009 
   (0.037) (0.037) (0.044) 
Heterogeneous syndicate    0.237***[++] 0.064 
    (0.069) (0.064) 
Homogenous syndicate    0.035 -0.020 
    (0.069) (0.077) 
(Heterogeneous)x(Private-led)     0.273** 
     (0.121) 
Age -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Initial patent stock 0.145*** 0.141*** 0.140*** 0.146*** 0.147*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
      
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 298 298 298 298 298 
R2 0.245 0.255 0.262 0.278 0.307 
F 4.76*** 4.41*** 4.88*** 5.04*** 5.29*** 
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Panel B:  
 





      
1 year 0.032 0.042 0.063* 0.125**[++] 0.282**[++] 
      
2 years 0.051* 0.080**[+] 0.099** 0.176**[++] 0.313**[++] 
      
4 years 0.093** 0.135***[+] 0.210***[++] 0.297***[++] 0.452***[++] 
      
5 years 0.118*** 0.164***[+] 0.250***[++] 0.350***[++] 0.543***[++] 
      
      
  Governmental lead Stand-alone 
Homogenous 
syndicate  
      
1 year  0.012 0.019 -0.019  
      
2 years  -0.002 0.032 -0.002  
      
4 years  0.025 0.049 0.065  
      
5 years  0.045 0.066 0.079  
      
 
Legend: The sample consists of 153 VC-backed and 153 matched control companies. An OLS regression with robust 
standard errors (White, 1980) is used. The number of observations for the 1-year, 2-year, 4-year and 5-year model is 306, 
305, 286, and 258, respectively. The dependent variable is the increase in log patent stock in t+3 (Panel A), t+1, t+2, t+4, 
and t+5 (Panel B) over the discounted level of log patent stock in t and is computed as [log(1+patent stockt+τ)-log(1+0.85τ 
patent stockt)] with τ=1,…,5. VC dummy is equal to one for the companies from the VC-backed sample. Private-led is equal 
to 1 for deals led by a private VC. Government-led is equal to 1 for deals led by a governmental VC. Syndicate is equal to 1 
if multiple VCs are involved in the transaction. Stand-alone is equal to 1 if only one investor is involved in the deal. 
Heterogeneous syndicate is equal to 1 when both private and governmental VCs participate. Homogenous syndicate is equal 
to one for syndicates in which only one type of investor participates (i.e., governmental homogeneous syndicates and private 
homogeneous syndicates). (Heterogeneous) x (Private-led) is the interaction between Heterogeneous syndicate and Private-
led. Age is the firm log(1+age) at time of the investment. Initial patent stock is the firm’s log(1+patent stockt). Panel B 
shows only coefficients on VC-related variables. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. ++ and + in squared brackets indicate that the difference between the coefficients of interest 
(i.e., Private-led and Government-led in Model 2, Syndicate and Stand-alone in Model 3, Heterogeneous syndicate and 
Homogeneous syndicate in Model 4, Heterogeneous syndicate and (Heterogeneous) x (Private-led) in Model 5) is 
significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are in brackets and appear below the related coefficients 
(Panel A).  
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Table 5: Venture capital forms and patent stock  
 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 
Private-led 
heterogeneous syndicate  
0.255** 0.347*** 0.397*** 0.559*** 0.671*** 
(0.099) (0.101) (0.097) (0.137) (0.150)   
Private stand-alone 
0.018[++] 0.052[+++] 0.053[+++] 0.074[+++] 0.091*[+++]  
(0.027) (0.036) (0.046) (0.051) (0.055)   
Governmental stand-
alone 
0.026[++] 0.003[+++] -0.013[+++] 0.016[+++] 0.032[+++] 
(0.035) (0.039) (0.044) (0.056) (0.061)   
Governmental syndicate 
-0.019[+++] -0.006[+++] 0.061[+++] 0.057[+++] 0.081[+++] 
(0.031) (0.051) (0.056) (0.051) (0.061)   
Homogeneous private 
syndicate 
-0.022[+++] -0.005[+++] 0.031[+++] 0.062[+++] 0.070[+++] 
(0.021) (0.050) (0.078) (0.084) (0.120)   
Age 
-0.003 -0.007** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.013*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)   
Initial patent stock 
0.077*** 0.113*** 0.147*** 0.156*** 0.195*** 
(0.021) (0.027) (0.034) (0.039) (0.045)   
      
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 306 305 298 286 258 
R2 0.195 0.269 0.307 0.336 0.384 
F 1.98*** 4.30*** 5.32*** 4.73*** 4.64*** 
      
 
Legend: The sample consists of 153 VC-backed and 153 matched control companies. The OLS regression with robust 
standard errors (White, 1980) is used. The dependent variable is the increase in log patent stock in t+3 (Panel A), t+1, t+2, 
t+4, and t+5 (Panel B) over the discounted level of log patent stock in t and is computed as [log(1+patent stockt+τ)-
log(1+0.85τ patent stockt)] with τ=1,…,5. Private stand-alone indicates a stand-alone private venture capital investment. 
Governmental stand-alone indicates a stand-alone governmental venture capital investment. Governmental syndicate 
indicates either a syndicate led by a governmental VC, in which private VCs are also present, or a syndicate composed only 
of governmental VCs. Private-led heterogeneous syndicate indicates a syndicate led by a private VC in which governmental 
VCs are also involved. Homogeneous private syndicate indicates a syndicate composed only of private VCs. Age is the firm 
log(1+age) at the time of the investment. Initial patent stock is the firm’s log(1+patent stockt). ***, **, and * indicate that 
the coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. +++, ++, and +, in squared brackets, indicate that 
the difference between the coefficient of this form and the form “Private-led heterogeneous syndicate” is significant at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are in brackets and appear below the related coefficients.  
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Table 6: Robustness checks – Venture capital forms and patent stock  
 Tobit estimation Family size 
Non-








1.051*** 0.432*** 0.712*** 0.396*** 0.426*** 0.384*** 0.403*** 
(0.202) (0.106) (0.193) (0.094) (0.097) (0.094) (0.097) 
Private stand-alone 0.307**[+++] 0.067[+++] 0.101[+++] 0.058[+++] 0.026[+++] -0.004[+++] 0.056[+++] (0.151) (0.046) (0.075) (0.048) (0.053) (0.048) (0.046) 
Governmental stand-alone 0.220[+++] -0.001[+++] 0.010[+++] -0.007[+++] -0.029[+++] -0.030[+++] -0.010[+++] (0.183) (0.047) (0.082) (0.057) (0.056) (0.045) (0.043) 
Governmental syndicate 0.283 0.060[+++] 0.152[++] 0.077[++] 0.028[+++] 0.062[+++] 0.065[+++] (0.501) (0.050) (0.120) (0.098) (0.061) (0.058) (0.055) 
Homogeneous private syndicate 0.422[++] 0.038[+++] 0.063[+++] 0.039[+++] -0.054[+++] -0.029[+++] 0.032[+++] (0.264) (0.079) (0.142) (0.093) (0.040) (0.045) (0.079) 
Age -0.038 -0.009*** -0.016***  -0.012** -0.013*** -0.010*** (0.030) (0.003) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
Initial patent stock 0.563*** 0.095*** 0.189*** 0.147*** 0.170*** 0.148*** 0.149*** (0.091) (0.028) (0.050) (0.042) (0.040) (0.034) (0.034) 
Size     -0.002       (0.007)    
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 298 298 298 222 230 240 298 
R2 (Tobit: Pseudo R2) 0.291 0.261 0.274 0.299 0.329 0.370 0.296 
F (Tobit: LR Chi2) 107.450 5.178 5.471 4.070 5.162 5.303 5.471 
Legend: We employ OLS regressions with robust standard errors (Columns 2-7) and a Tobit model with bootstrapped standard errors (Column 1). The dependent variable is the increase in log patent stock in year 
t+3 over the discounted value of patent stock in year t shown in Columns 1 and 4-7. The dependent variable in Column 2 is the increase in family size-weighted log patent stock in t+3 over the discounted level of 
family size-weighted log patent stock at year t. The dependent variable in Column 3 is the increase in non-discounted log patent stock in t+3 over the level of non-discounted log patent stock at year t. Column 4 
includes size instead of age as a regressor. Model 5 excludes companies from the UK. Model 6 excludes pharmaceuticals. Model 7 is performed on a matched control sample obtained by computing different 
propensity scores for private and governmental VC. Private stand-alone indicates a stand-alone private venture capital investment. Governmental stand-alone indicates a stand-alone governmental venture capital 
investment. Governmental syndicate indicates a either syndicate led by a governmental VC in which private VCs are also present or a syndicate composed only of governmental VCs. Private-led heterogeneous 
syndicate indicates a syndicate led by a private VC in which governmental VCs are also involved. Homogeneous private syndicate indicates a syndicate composed only of private VCs. Age is the firm log(1+age) 
at the time of the investment. Size is the firm log(1+total assets) at the time of the investment. Initial Patent stock is the firm’s log(1+patent stockt). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. +++, ++, and +, in squared brackets, indicate that the difference between the coefficient of this form and the form “Private-led heterogeneous syndicate” is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. Standard errors are in brackets and appear below the related coefficients. 
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Legend: The vertical axis reports the increase in log patent stock over the discounted level of the beginning-of-period log 
patent stock and is computed as [log(1+patent stockt+τ)-log(1+0.85τ patent stockt)]. The horizontal axis represents the years 
since the initial venture capital investment, τ=1,…,5. 
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Figure 2 – The evolution of patent stock for different venture capital forms and the 
matched control sample 
Panel A 
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Legend: The vertical axis reports the increase in log patent stock over the discounted level of the beginning-of-period log 
patent stock and is computed as [log(1+patent stockt+τ)-log(1+0.85τ patent stockt)]. The horizontal axis represents the years 




Our matching procedure relies on propensity scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman 
et al., 1998). First, our sample is divided into a treated group (VC-backed companies) and a 
non-treated group (companies that do not receive VC). To each firm from the former group, 
we match the firm from the latter group that has the closest propensity score to be a target for 
VCs. The longitudinal nature of the dataset allows us to compute the propensity score using a 
survival model, which is more appropriate for estimating the likelihood of absorbing state 
events.  
We use a Weibull distribution, a common parametric specification, for the hazard function 
and include among the regressors a firm’s lagged patent stock and the log number of 
employees together with a full set of country and year dummies. We also include a seed 
dummy that is equal to 1 when the firm is in the seed stage. The results are reported in 
Column 1 of Table A.1. Interestingly, Table A.1 shows that the ideal candidate for European 
VCs, at least in biotech and pharmaceuticals, seems to be a relatively small, young company 
with a large patent stock.  
As a robustness check, we allow private and governmental VCs to follow different selection 
criteria and re-estimate the model for private and governmental VCs separately. The results, 
presented in Columns 2 and 3 in Table A.1, show that private and governmental VCs have 
similar selection criteria; governmental VCs, however, seem to more readily invest at the seed 
stage and less interested in patent stock. 
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Table A.1: VC survival estimates 
 VC Private VC Governmental VC 
Patent stock 0.872*** 0.898*** 0.732*** 
 (0.154) (0.154) (0.213) 
Employees -1.128*** -1.211*** -0.956*** 
 (0.240) (0.313) (0.334) 
Seed 2.566*** 2.199*** 3.773*** 
 (0.356) (0.420) (0.740) 
Constant -8.106*** -9.408*** -9.412*** 
 (0.520) (1.013) (0.826) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
N observations 7,520 7,854 8,103 
N companies 859 859 859 
 
Legend: The sample (panel) consists of the biotech and pharmaceutical portion of the VICO dataset. The dependent variable 
is the hazard ratio of obtaining a first-round investment from a VC (Column 1), from a private VC (Column 2) or from a 
governmental VC (Column 3) in a given year t. Estimations are performed using a Weibull regression. Patent stock is the 
log (1+patent stock) in year t-1. Employees is the log(1+employees) in year t-1. Seed is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm is at the 
seed stage in year t. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors 
are in brackets below the related coefficients. 
